Analysis-Xi’s New Generals Face Tough Military Challenges Post-Congress

Chinese President Xi Jinping has enacted significant changes to the structure, posture, and capability of the world's largest military during his first two terms in office.

In those ten years, China has developed and advanced its naval and rocket forces quickly, purged thousands of officers for corruption, reorganized its command structure, and established bases deep in Southeast Asia's maritime interior.

Now, his Central Military Commission must take tricky next steps to overhaul its leadership, which oversees China's two million-strong People's Liberation Army and may tighten Xi's control over the military and its modernization.

The once every five years congress of the Chinese Communist Party began on Sunday. At this meeting, it is anticipated that the party will name replacements for the four senior officers who are retiring from the commission's six senior officers. The body's vice chairmen, Generals Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia, both 72, are among those anticipated to retire. Many people consider Zhang to be a close ally of Xi.

Eight Asian and Western military attaches and seven security analysts argue that their replacements must incorporate increasingly complex forces that are necessary for a Taiwan invasion in order to satisfy Xi's long-standing demand that the military be able to "fight and win wars."

China must "be prepared for danger in times of peace," according to Xi, who called for accelerating the development of a military of the highest caliber when he opened the meeting.

The traditional U.S. strategic dominance in East Asia is being challenged by China's military modernization, creating new diplomatic challenges.

The military envoys and three of the analysts claim that in addition to addressing potential external pressure to intensify international engagement over its nuclear arsenal, the commission will need to secure foreign base and port access for its growing naval fleet. Modernization may become more challenging if the economy weakens.

Despite all of these difficulties, the majority of the new generals are probably lacking in one quality that at least some of their commission predecessors had: combat experience.

Zhang is among the last active officers to have participated in the bloody border conflict with Vietnam, which began with a troubled Chinese invasion in 1979 and lasted until the late 1980s. General Li Zuocheng, a commission member, is also expected to retire.

Recent commanders from the newly reorganized Eastern and Western theatre commands, which are in charge of Taiwan and the Indian border respectively, are potential replacements, according to eight envoys. Additionally, the Southern Theatre command, which is home to important naval bases, may offer promotions.

Who is selected may reveal Xi's military objectives. Political commissar promotions will almost certainly be used to offset any operational decisions given their ongoing responsibility for ensuring that the military serves the Communist Party rather than the nation.

The commission, which is based out of a command center in western Beijing that is both imposing and well-protected, technically reports to the party's Central Committee but in reality closely reports to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Xi is the head of each body.

Because of this overlap, some analysts have advised against making Taiwan invasion predictions based on any new commission lineup. They assert that such a significant choice would be made by the Standing Committee rather than ambitious generals.

The problem for the PLA is a lack of operational experience, according to Alexander Neill, a private military analyst. "There is no shortage of senior military officers who internally parrot Xi's 'fight and win' mantra," he said.

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore's James Char said the PLA had "shortcomings" in combined arms and joint operations.

Its ability to project power over an extended period of time is currently limited, according to Char.

Requests for comments from the Chinese Ministry of Defense were not answered.

LOYALTY

It is crucial to have unwavering loyalty to Xi.

Four diplomats monitoring the situation predict that veteran commissar Admiral Miao Hua, head of the commission's Political Work Department, will continue to advance toward one of the Vice Chair positions.

Miao, who has historical ties to Xi from when the two were both posted in the coastal province of Fujian across from Taiwan, will almost certainly be countered by a more tactical commander, perhaps Army general Liu Zhenli. View More

He Weidong and Xu Qiling, recent Eastern and Western commanders, are two officers who were recently promoted to staff positions at the commission and are being closely watched. Xu Qiling also has operational experience in Taiwan.

The PLA's limited capacity to fully integrate its forces within and across commands—the so-called "jointness" that Xi is eager to promote—was demonstrated by the drills conducted around Taiwan in August following the visit of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei.

Recent assessments by senior Pentagon officials that they did not believe China would invade Taiwan in the next two years were reaffirmed.

Officials from the United States have privately stated that they do not think China will be militarily prepared to annex Taiwan by even 2027.

NUCLEAR FOCUS

For some diplomats and academics, China's nuclear forces, which Pentagon assessments claim are growing at a faster-than-expected rate, highlight the growing significance of the commission.

According to the Pentagon's most recent annual report on China's military modernization, China is anticipated to have up to 700 nuclear warheads that are capable of being delivered over the course of Xi's next five-year term and 1,000 by 2030.

In modernized silos, more of those weapons are anticipated to be kept in a state of advanced readiness. According to the report, China now seems to be operating a "nuclear triad" that can launch missiles from land, aircraft, and submarines.

Despite the growing influence of routinely untrustworthy commissars on the commission, Christopher Twomey, a security expert at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in California, said it was critical to resume international exchanges in order to better understand Beijing's changing nuclear doctrine.

According to Twomey, "the new CMC will have a significant voice" in deciding whether to work with the United States to maintain stability in the strategic nuclear arena. While more globally aware officers may be more aware of the dangers of spirals and unintentional escalation, one suspects that political force leaders will be the most suspicious.